Abstract. In a proxy re-encryption system, a semi-trusted proxy can convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into one encrypting the same plaintext for Bob without seeing the underlying plaintext. However, a fine-grained delegation is demanded in some scenarios. For this, Weng et al. introduce the notion of conditional proxy re-encryption (CPRE), and formalize its security model and propose an efficient CPRE scheme. This paper presents the notion of identity-based multi-condition proxy re-encryption, which is a variant of identity-based condition proxy re-encryption. In such system, ciphertexts are generated under specified conditions by Alice, and the proxy can translate the ciphertext if the relevant conditions are satisfied. We formalize its security model and construct a concrete multi-condition proxy re-encryption scheme, and prove its security in the standard model.
Introduction
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss introduced concept of proxy re-encryption [1] . A semi-trusted proxy converts any ciphertext under Alice's public key into ciphertext under Bob's public key without being able to infer any information on the corresponding plaintext. A number of proxy re-encryption systems have been proposed in the context of public-key encryption [2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9] .
Green and Ateniese extended the notion of proxy re-encryption to the area of Identity Based, so called Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (IBPRE). Senders encrypt messages using the recipient's identity (a string) as the public key and the proxy uses proxy keys, or re-encryption keys to transform ciphertext from one identity to another without being able to learn the plaintext and to deduce secret keys of Alice or Bob from the proxy keys in the IBPRE system. Then many of the IBPRE schemes have been proposed in identity-based setting [4, 7, 10, 14, 17] .
In actual application, there exist scenarios which ciphertext under Alice's public key is not completely translated into ciphertext with Bob's private key to decrypt it, for example, Alice wants only to convert this type emails which subject contain urgent keyword. However, traditional PRE system enables the proxy to transform all of email which is encrypted by Alice without any discrimination. To meet the issue, notion of type-based proxy re-encryption (TBPRE) [11] and concept of conditional proxy re-encryption (CPRE) [12] were introduced by Tang and Weng, respectively. In CPRE systems, delegator can implement fine-grained delegation of decryption rights by additional condition.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of Identity-based multi-condition proxy re-encryption (IBMCPRE), in which delegator will augment number of condition to effectively control proxy powers to convert one ciphertext into another. And then we formalize the definition and security notions for IBMCPRE, and further propose a concrete IBMCPRE scheme, and prove its security in the standard model. from Bob to Alice. In 2006, Ateniese et al. [2] presented unidirectional PRE schemes based on bilinear pairings. In ACM CCS'07, Canetti and Hohenberger [5] presented a CCA-secure bidirectional PRE scheme from bilinear pairings. Later, Libert and Vergnaud [3] proposed the first unidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model. In CANS'08, Deng et al. [6] constructed a CCA-secure bidirectional PRE scheme without pairings. In PKC'09, Shao and Cao [8] proposed a unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings; Weng et al. [9] presented an efficient CCA-secure unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings.
Green and Ateniese [4] extended the notion of proxy re-encryption to the area of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), in which senders encrypt messages using the recipient's identity (a string) as the public key, and presented tow non-interactive, unidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes in the IBE setting. Similarly, Matsuo [7] , Chu and Tzeng [10] also studied proxy re-encryption in identity-based setting, respectively.
Traceable proxy re-encryption, introduced by Libert and Vergnaud [13] , attempts to solve the problem of disclosing re-encryption keys, by tracing the proxies who have done so. To more effectively control rights of proxy re-encryption, in [12] , Weng and others introduced the notion of conditional proxy re-encryption (CPRE) with bilinear pairings and gave a new scheme for CPRE [16] . Later, Vivek and others [15] proposed a CPRE scheme to use substantially less number of bilinear pairings. In [14] , Zhou and others introduced the notion of identity-based conditional proxy re-encryption (IBCPRE), and presented a concrete IBCPRE scheme.
Contributions and Paper Organization
We formalize identity-based multi-condition proxy re-encryption system model and construct a concrete multi-condition proxy re-encryption scheme in the standard model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Preliminaries section, we review some properties of bilinear pairing and complexity assumptions, we formalize the definition and security notions of identity-based multi-condition proxy re-encryption (IBMCPRE), and propose a concrete IBMCPRE scheme form pairings and give security proof of scheme, in Model of IBMCPRE Systems section and IBMCPRE Scheme section, respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in Conclusion section.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review definition of bilinear pairing and a complex assumption on which our scheme is based.
Bilinear Groups and Bilinear Pairings Let G and G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups with the same prime order q. A bilinear pairing is a map : , where the probability is over the random choice of generator g in G, the random choice of a, b, c in Z q , and the random bits consumed by .
Similarly, we say that an algorithm that outputs b {0, 1} has advantage ε in solving the ∈ decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem in (G,G T ) if 
where the probability is over the random choice of generator g in G, the random choice of a, b, c in Z q , and the random choice of Q∈G T .
Definition 1. We say that the (t, ε)-DBDH assumption holds in (G, G T ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least ε in solving the DBDH problem in (G, G T ).

Model of IBMCPRE System
We give the definitions and security notions for IBMCPRE systems in this section. Dec(CT, sk ID ): The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk ID and a cipertext CT. It outputs a message m∈ or the error symbol ⊥.
Definition of IBMCPRE systems
Security Notions of IBMCPRE systems
In this subsection, we will define the security notions for IBMCPRE systems following definition in [14] . The semantic security under adaptive-ID and chosen plaintext attacks for an IBMCPRE scheme is defined according to the following game between an adversary  and a challenger : 
IBMCPRE Scheme
Based on Waters's identity-based encryption scheme [17] and Zhou's identity-based conditional proxy re-encryption scheme [14] , we propose an IBMCPRE scheme, and prove the security under the DBDH assumption.
The IBMCPRE scheme consists of the following algorithms: Setup (1 κ ): The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ. It first generates (q, G, G T ,e), where q is a κ-bit prime, G and G T are two cyclic multiplicative groups with prime order q, e is the bilinear pairing : 
